CONFLICT OF LAWS UNDER THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT AND UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT.

The Uniform Acts, produced by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, create a condition of uniform law only among
the states which adopt them. In the period preceding universal
adoption of a particular act there are many points of law as to
which there is conflict between the law of the act and the common law of a state Which has not adopted it. Legal transactions
and situations will arise during that period, some elements of
which have their situs or locus in a jurisdiction governed by a
uniform act, others in a jurisdiction governed by a different
common law rule. If such situations and transactions come
before courts for adjudication choice of law will have to be made
in accordance with the principles of Conflict of Laws.
The territorial applicability of some of the provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act causes little difficulty. It is a familiar
principle that a forum. applies its own rules of procedure and
none other. Sections of the act which are procedural will therefore
be applied only by the courts of a jurisdiction which has adopted
the act. Such sections as Sec. 40, consisting of Rules for Distribution of Insolvent Estates of Partnerships or of Partners, and
Sec. 7 (4), which establishes rules of prima facie evidence for
determining the existence of a partnership, are clearly procedural. Another familiar principle, that the acquisition, holding
and disposal of title to real estate is governed by the law of the
situs, limits the applicability of Sec. 8 (3) and (4), and. Sec. io,
which provide for the acquisition and conveyance of partnership
real estate, to cases involving real estate, the situs of which is in
a jurisdiction which has adopted the act. The more difficult problems of Conflict of Laws arise out of contracts and other transactions by partners in jurisdictions other than that in which the
partnership has its situs, when there is a difference between the
law of the locus of the transaction and of the situs or domicile
of the partnership. A few such problems will now be stated, with
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suggestions for their solution, and references to the few pertinent
decisions that have been found.
First.-A and B in Pennsylvania (one of the first states to
adopt the Uniform Partnership Act) make a contract under
which B is to carry on a business in State X (a state which has
not adopted the act), and for some consideration furnished by
A he is to receive a share in the profits of the business. C becomes a creditor of B in State X, and according to the law of X;
A is liable on the contract because of the fact of his profit sharing. 1
Section 7 of the act, entitled "Rules for Determining the
Existence of a Partnership," reads in part as follows:
"In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall
apply:
"(i) Except as provided by section 16, persons who are not
partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons." (Section i6 provides for partners by estoppel.)
Can C hold A liable as a partner?
If A is liable on a contract made by B it is because of an
act on his part which is by law of X given the effect of constituting him a co-principal in relation to the transactions of B. The
act to which the law gives that effect is not the executory agreement of A and B, that profits"shall be shared, but the performance
of that agreement by the carrying on of business and sharing of
profits. 2 If A did become entitled to a share in profits in X, then
under the law of X he became a principal and liable to third persons as a partner on B's contracts in the course of the business.
The liability is created, if at all, not by the executory agreement
in Pennsylvania, but by the profit sharing in X,. and in accordance
with the law'of X.3 C therefore can hold A liable.
Suppose, instead of suing in State X, where the law of the
forum concurs with the law of the locus of the contract between
B and C, and the law of the locus of the event of profit sharing,
which determines A's legal relation to B's contracts, all agreeing
"See collection of authorities on partnership liability based on profit
sharing, in x8 L R. A., N. S., 963.
.Hart v. Kelley, 83 Pa. 2.

'Waverly National Bank v. Hall, i5o Pa. 466; Citizens National Bank v.
Hine, 49 Ct. 236.
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in imposing liability on A, that suit is brought in Pennsylvania.
Will the fact that the law of the forum is opposed to liability in
such a case affect the result? It might be claimed that the forum
should not, fb'r reasons of public policy, impose on a citizen a
liability contrary to the statutes of the forum and of his domicile.
On such a ground the United States Supreme Court has refused
to enforce against a married woman sued in the court of her
domicile, a contract, valid by the law of the place of contracting,
but invalid for lack of capacity by -the statutes of the forum and
domicile of the defendant.4 It is hardly likely that Sec. 7 (I)'
will be considered as involving so strong considerations of public
policy as the laws for protection of the property of married
women.
It might be argued that Sec. 7 (i) is a procedural
provision and therefore necessarily applicable by the forum., The
title of the section, "Rules for Determining the Existence of a
Partnership" suggests rules of evidence. Sub-section (4) seems
undoubtedly to contain rules of evidence, and to be a procedural
section applicable by the courts of the jurisdiction which has
adopted the act, and none other.8 But as sub-section (i) is
4

Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 38 Supreme Court (U. S.) x47.
'Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 7:
'Sec. 7. (Rules for Determining the Existence of a Partnership.) In
determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:"(i) Except as provided by section 16, persons who are not partners as
to each other are not partners as to third persons.
"(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a
partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by
the use of the property.
"(3) The sharing of gross" returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right
or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.
"(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
"(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
"(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
"(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
"(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with
the profits of the business.
"(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good-will of a business or
other property by installments or otherwise."
'A forum applies its own rule of what is prima facie evidence, even to a
transaction occurring in another jurisdiction, Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, s4
Ohio St. zo; and not the rule of the jurisdiction in which the transaction
*occurred, Jones v. Chic., St. P., N. & 0. R. Co., 8o Minn. 488.
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worded in language appropriate to a rule of substantive law, it
would probably not be held to be procedural, in spite of its context. Vhercver suit is brought, A's liability to third persons as a
partner should be determined by the law of X.
Second.-The firm of A and B is formed in Pennsylvania,
where it maintains its principal place of business. A is in charge
of a branch in State X, and there executes aid delivers to C a
promissory note in the name of the firm for money loaned. No
member of the firm is expressly authorized to borrow money or
execute notes, but such acts are usual in the conduct of the business
of other firms in the same line of business in the community
where the branch is located and A has'acted. By the law of X the
firm is bound by the note.7 Under section 9 (1) and (2),8 the
firm is not liable, because the act of A is not "apparently carrying
on in the usual way the business of the partnership." Is the
firm liable?
As no question of procedure is involved, it .should make no
difference where suit is brought. The issue is whether the implied authority of a partner depends upon the law of the place
where he acts, or on the law of the place where the firm was or?
ganized and has its principal place of liusiness. He is the agent
of the firm to carry on its business in X; and in the furtherance
of its business does an act. Whether that act is within the incidental powers attached to the general power to carry on the firm
A member of a trading firm is presumed to have authority to issue
negotiable instruments, and the course of business of other firms in the same
community engaged in the same general line of business is the measure of
his implied authority. Woodruff v. Scaife, 83 Ala. 152; Standard Wagon Co.
v. Few & Co., rig Ga. 293; Smith v. Collins, II5 Mass. 388; Buckley v. Wood
& Co., 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 39i; Irwin v. Villiar, i1o U. S. 4x9. The commissioners have deliberately adopted a narrower rule for the act. See 28 Harv.

Law Rev. 779; 29 ibid. 299.
'Uniform Partnership Act, See. 9:
"Sec. 9. (Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership Business.)
"(x)

Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its

business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way
the businesss of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership
in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
"(2) An act of a partnee which is not apparently for the carrying on of
the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership,
unless authorized by the other partners."
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business should depend on the law of the place where he is, by
autherity from the partnership, carrying on the business. This
view is supported by the weight of authority both in cases of
partnership,9 and agency.' 0
Third.-A, a member of the Pennsylvania partnership of A
and B, makes a contract "with C in state X. By the law of X
partnership liability is joint and several. Under- section i5 of
the act, partnership liability is joint. Is the liability joint, or
joint and several?
There is no question that the contract is a valid contract, and
that A and B as partners are parties to the contract. -The question is as to the nature of the liability created, the effect of the
contract, whether it is determined by the law of the contract, or
by the law of the place where the agency relation was created
between the firm of A and B, and the acting partner A. The
issue is analogous to that in the preceding problem. Assuming
an agency to exist, then the scope of the incidental powers, the
means and methods legally permissible for the execution of the
agency, should depend on the law of the place where the agent
acts. The liability should therefore be joint and several. An
analogous question has been passed on in Louisiana." By the
law of Louisiana, where the contract was made, liability of each
partner in the sort of partnership involved was for his virile
share, while by the law of Pennsylvania, where the partners were
domiciled, liability was ht solido. It was held that the extent of
the liability was governed by the law of the contract, not of the
situs of the partnership.
Suppose the contract made by A with C in State X was to
be performed by the partnership in Pennsylvania. By the majority of courts the effect and liability created by the contract, as
well as its validity, would be determined in accordance with the
law of the place of performance.' 2
'Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. 61&-

"Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. (I89x), I Q. B.
79;
American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 77 So. Rept.
168 (Florida, I917) ; contra, Freeman's Appeal, 68 Ct, 533.
Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Martin, N. S., z92.
'Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 172; Baum v. Birchall, 15o Pa. 164; Burnettv. Pennsylvania

Railroad, 176 Pa. 45. See cases collected in articles by J. -.
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Suppose the contract was made and was to be performed in.
State X, but suit is brought in Pennsylyania. It might be
claimed that whether a partner can be sued alone as severally liable,
or whether all must be joined, is a question of who are the proper
parties to the action, a question of procedure to which.the law of the
forum applies. The statutes making partnership liability joint and
several have been treated by the courts of some ofthe states in which
they have been adopted as procedural, and the liability "is deemed
to be joint and, several for the purposes of suit," and not as
changed in respect to the substantive lav.13: If. the statute of
X making liability joint and several is a rule of substantive law,
it should be enforced by the forum. 1 4

If the statute is merely

procedural; the forum would give no effect to it. Decisions of
the courts of X should guide the forum in construing the statute.
Fourth.-A, a member of the Pennsylvania firm of A and
B, in Pennsylvania, executes and delivers to C, his separate creditor, a firm note. C takes the note to X and endorses it before
maturity to D, a, purchaser for value without notice. By the
law of X, D can enforce the note against the firm, while by the
law of Pennsylvania he can not.15 Which, law governs?
Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract," 23 Harv. Law Rev.
179, 194, 26o.
"Some statutes are obviously' procedural, as that of Dis. Col. Code,
Sece i205, to the effect that partnership contracts and obligations "shall for

the purpose of suit thereupon be deemed to be joint and- several," the New
York Statute III, Consolidated Laws, page 2522, reading: "Every general
partner is liable to third persons for all the obligations of the partnership
jointly and s6verally with his general partners," appears to be a statement
of substantive law. See article by F. M. Burdick, "Liability of Partners,"
rTCol. Law Rev. io".
"Cf. Elmer v. Hall; 148 Pa. 345, which holds that under the statutes
of New York an assignee becomes legal owner of the claim assigned and,
therefore, where, the assignment was made in New York, under the operation
of New York law, the assignee acquired the power to sue in his own name
anywhere.
:"The pertinent provisions of the act are as follows:
'Sec. 9, (.Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership Business.)
"(r) Every partner is.an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every'partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way
the business of the partnership, of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in -fact no'authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.,
"(2) An act of a partner which is not apparentlyr for the carrying on of
the business of the partnership in the-usual way does not bind the partnership,
unless authorized by the other partners,'".
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We have an instrument which is, by the law of the place of
making, void and unenforceable by a transferee. Can that instrumient be validated by a negotiation in a state by whose laws
it would have that result? It is a question of the effect of negotiation to cut off defenses of the maker. That is possible only if
the note is issued with the inherent potentiality of being validated
by negotiation. It must have that as one of its attributes from
the first. That attribute, generally called negotiability, must
therefore be attached to it by the law of the place of making. Only
by operation of that law is it a negotiable instrument.1 6 .
Fifth.-A, B and C form and carry on a partnership in State
X. C dies. Subsequently B makes a contract in Pennsylvania,
in the partnership name, with D. No notice of dissolution of
the partnership has been given and by the law of State X, in case
of dissolution by death, no notice is necessary to terminate authority of partners to bind co-partners by further contracts. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 35, notice of dissolution is
necessary in order to terminate the authority of a partner, except
when the partnership is dissolved because it is unlawful to carry
on the business. D sues the surviving members of the firm in
Pennsylvania. Are they both liable?
This is a question of the relation of A to B at the
time of
B's act. Has the former relation of principal and agent terminated or not? The law governing the relation and its termination is the law of the place where the relation was formed and
While making the note is, so far as D is aware, "apparently for carrying
on the business in the usual way," yet C, "the person with whom he (A) is
dealing, has-knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority." The note
does not therefore bind the partnership, even in the hands of D.
This may seem an over literal construction of the act, but such a construction is not impossible. It might even seem that such construction is the
one which would be expected from a court which has construed the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act in so mechanical a fashion as in Wisner v. The
First National Bank of Gallitzin, 220 Pa. 2r. (Holding that as Sec. i85
declares that a check is a bill of exchange, the failure of a drawee bank to
return a check within twenty-four hours after delivery constitutes an acceptance under Sec. 137. The legislature promptly amended the latter section by
adding a proviso: "That the provisions of this section shall not apply to
checks." 6 Pur. Dig. 701&)
: For common law decisions favoring D, see Ames' Cases on Partnership,
s9 n.; 30 Cyc. 5x3.
"Herdic v. Roessler, iog N. Y. 127; Ory v. Winter, 4 Martin, N. S., 277.
For other cases see 61 L R. A. 208 n.
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was being principally carried on-the law of State X. If the
relation was terminated under that law, though no notice was
given, then A, acting in Pennsylvania, does not represent B and
can not make him a party to a contract. This is in accordance
with the decision in a converse case: Easton v. George Wostenholm & Son.1 7 In that case a California partnership had a
branch in Costa Rica, where a partner made a contract, after the
retirement of a co-partner, without giving the notice required
under the law of California. It was held that the co-partner was
liable, irrespective of the law of Costa Rica, which apparently
did not require notice. If notice made necessary by the law of
the domicile of the partnership is indispensable to terminate authority to act elsewhere, it should follow that authority to act
elsewhere is terminated if, without notice, the agency relation
terminates at the domicile of the partnership.
Sixth.-A and B form and carry on a partnership in Pennsylvania. It is voluntarily dissolved and A is appointed liquidating
partner. A gives a promissory note to C in payment of a debt
barred by the Statute of Limitations. C brings suit on the note
in State X. By the'law of State X a liquidating partner has no
power to revive a liability barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Under the Partnership Act, Sec. 35 (a), a partner, after dissolution, can bind the partnership "by any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished
at dissolution." Under the previous Pennsylvania decisions it
has been held that a liquidating partner retains his power to revive a barred claim,1 8 and such acts awould probably be -held
within the authority'given by the act. Does the law of the forum
or the law of the domicile of the partnership and place of con-,
tracting govern?
By the law of the forum, the Statute of Limitations can be
tolled by a new promise. There has been a new promise. Thatsatisfies the law of the forum,, provided the new promise is binding on the co-partner. This Utter question depends on whether
dissolution has terminated the partner's powers, and- should be
i37
1? Federal 524.

,Houser v. Irvine, 3 W. & S. 345; Reppert v. Colvin, 48 Pa. 248; Wilson
v. Waugh, ioi Pa. 233.
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govcrned by the law of the jurisdiction in which the dissolution
occurs. Therefore, the law of Pennsylvania should apply. In
the only case of this sort which has been found, a contrary decision was rendered: Kerker v. Wood,'9 on the ground that this
question pertained wholly to the remedy.
Seventh.-A limited partnership is formed in Pennsylvania
under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. One of the general partners makes a contract in State X, which has no provisions whatever for the formation of a limited partnership. Is
a special partner liable on the contract?
This depends upon the relation between the special partner
and the active partner who made the contract. Is the special
partner a principal? This should be referred to the law governing the formation of the relation, that is, the law 20of Pennsylvania. This result has been reached in several cases.
If the action is brought in State X, it should make no difference that the forum has no statutory provisions for the formatibn of limited partnerships, as the institution of limited partnership is niot obnoxious to public policy, nor is it necessary to
disregard the institution for the protection of citizens of the
forum. Even if the court of State X should think otherwise on
the question of public policy it is difficult, to see how they could
hold the special partner liable as it is not a question of disregarding a right created in a foreign jurisdiction, but of the forum
attempting to create a right based on a transaction in a foreign
jurisdiction, namely, the formation of the relation between the
special and general partners, which according to the law governing the transaction does not create an agency relation at all. A
forum should not, solely out of its own law, create a legal relation, as of agency, burdensome to a person who has not acted or,
in fact, caused another to act within the jti'risdiction of its law.
Judson A. Crane;
University of PittsburghLaw School.
148 Ohio State 6x3.
" King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y. 24; Barrows v. Down, 9 R. I. 446.

